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Principles, Virtues, or Detachment? 
Some Appreciative Reflections 
on 
Karen Stohr’s On Manners 
by 
Bryan W. Van Norden 
(version of August 15, 2015) 
 
“It is thus in the medium of ceremony 
that the peculiarly human part of our life 
is lived.” – Fingarette, Confucius – The 
Secular as Sacred 
 
1Prof. Karen Stohr’s On Manners is a delightful book.  It is, most importantly, 
philosophically interesting, original, and insightful.  In addition, Prof. Stohr has 
achieved something that I aspire to, but generally fail to realize:  she skillfully 
integrates learned references to classic texts (including the writings of Plato, Aristotle, 
                                                        
1 Thanks to Prof. Stohr for writing her book and for thoughtfully engaging with a 
non-Western philosophical perspective, to Prof. Erin Cline for organizing a panel on 
Prof. Stohr’s book, to Prof. Yong Huang for allowing us to publish the essays 
resulting from the panel in Dao, and to two anonymous referees whose comments 
greatly improved my essay. 
 
  
Kant, Hume, Jane Austen, and Edith Wharton) with pop culture references (including 
Seinfeld, Curb Your Enthusiasm, Miss Manners, and Martha Stewart).  She does all 
this with a writing style that is clear, elegant, and often quite pithy. Many phrases 
from this book could become aphorisms. Another aphorist, Ashleigh Brilliant, once 
quipped, “Philosophers never agree on anything.  That is the one thing on which all 
philosophers agree.”  This is not quite true.  I found myself agreeing with a great 
many things that Prof. Stohr said.  However, admiration for a work of philosophy is 
best expressed in thoughtful critique, rather than in panegyric. 
 
The fundamental claim of Prof. Stohr’s book is that 
 
...rules of polite behavior are justified by their basis in commonly held moral 
principles and ideals, and...they play an essential role in enabling us to act on those 
principles and ideals. Social conventions...serve as vehicles through which we 
express important moral values like respect and consideration for the needs, ideas, 
and opinions of others. (Stohr, 2012:  3-4) 
 
Another way she puts this point is through the distinction between “manners” and 
“etiquette”： 
 
...the principles of manners are moral principles, and specific rules of etiquette get 
their authority from their relationship to those moral principles. ... [Rules of 
 
  
etiquette] are binding insofar as they are the established vehicle through which we 
express the important moral aims and goals reflected in the principles of manners. 
(Stohr, 2012:  23-24) 
 
Given this thesis, it is unfortunate that there are no references to Confucianism in the 
book.  Confucians have philosophically sophisticated things to say about etiquette, 
which they treat (like Prof. Stohr) as an aspect of ethics. In fact, Neo-Confucian 
philosophers describe something almost identical to the relationship between manners 
and etiquette:  they claim that the underlying moral Pattern of the universe is 
expressed through particular manifestations of etiquette or ritual (see Tiwald and Van 
Norden, 2014: 121). A classic discussion of “ritual” (li 禮), as Confucians call it, can 
be found in Herbert Fingarette’s book, Confucius -- The Secular as Sacred (1972).  
Fingarette is in the grip of an unfortunate behaviorism (more in the spirit of Gilbert 
Ryle than B.F. Skinner, thank goodness), but nonetheless Fingarette says much that is 
interesting and helpful on this topic.2 Ritual is also addressed in many recent books 
that take a virtue ethics approach to Confucianism.3  This leads me to the first of my 
                                                        
2 For a critique of Fingarette’s more extreme views, see Schwartz, 1985: 67-75. Other 
very valuable studies of ritual in Confucianism include Radcliffe-Brown, 1965, and 
Shun, 2002. 
3 Virtue ethics approaches to Confucianism first gained importance with Yearley’s 
Mencius and Aquinas:  Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage, 1990 (see 
his discussion of “propriety,” pp. 41-46).  Recent applications of this approach 
 
  
two major lines of critique.  In Part I of this essay, I shall argue that the significance 
of manners and etiquette is better understood using a virtue ethics framework, like 
that of Confucianism, rather than the language of Kantianism that Stohr often invokes.  
Within the Chinese tradition, Daoists have frequently been critics of Confucian 
ritualism.  Consequently, in Part II, I shall consider some possible Daoist critiques of 
Stohr’s work. I am largely playing devil’s advocate in the second part of this essay, 
because I am personally more sympathetic to Confucianism than to Daoism.  
However, Daoism is undeniably a profound and important philosophical and religious 
tradition, so it is worth taking seriously.         
 
I. Virtue Ethics Critique 
In Part I of this essay, I shall (A) sketch the fundamentally different intuitions that 
                                                                                                                                                               
include Angle 2012, Sim 2007, Tang 2012, Van Norden 2007 (see especially pp. 
101-112), Yu 2007 (see especially the discussion of “social rites” on pp. 96-102).  
Much ink has been spilled about whether this methodology is appropriate to the study 
of Confucianism.  Here I shall simply suggest that the opposition to using virtue 
ethics to better understand Confucianism is often rooted in the mistaken assumption 
that “virtue ethics” is shorthand for “Aristotle’s ethical views.”  In reality, virtue 
ethics is a family of often quite distinct ethical views that emphasizes the cultivation 
of dispositions to respond flexibly to complex and fluid situations.  The value of the 
virtue ethics approach to Confucianism is that it allows us to explore the similarities 
and differences among such views. 
 
  
motivate Kantianism and virtue ethics, (B) use one of Prof. Stohr’s own examples to 
illustrate why exploring someone’s character often seems more illuminating than 
focusing on the morality of individual actions, (C) use another of her examples to 
illustrate the differences between Confucian and Kantian views of practical reasoning, 
and (D) contrast Confucian and Kantian accounts of what is problematic about 
flaunting one’s vices. 
A. Kant vs. Virtue Ethics 
In explaining the significance of manners and etiquette, Prof. Stohr draws freely on 
the resources provided by the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, and Hume.  Prof. 
Stohr writes, 
 
Taken by themselves, these moral theories are deeply incompatible in very 
important ways.  I am mostly going to ignore those incompatibilities, on the 
grounds that seeing what makes philosophical theories distinct from each other is 
not particularly important to my project here. (Stohr, 2012:  27) 
 
On the one hand, I was impressed with her willingness to follow her intuitions where 
they led her, regardless of what philosophical label they are conventionally associated 
with.  However, I continued to have a concern that there was a problematic tension 
between these approaches that she had not fully faced.  Specifically, it seems to me 
that following a virtue ethics approach does a better job of handling our intuitions 
about manners and etiquette.  I realize that Kant does discuss the virtues, and there 
 
  
have been efforts, some of them quite thoughtful, to reconcile Kantianism and 
Aristotelianism (see O’Neill 1989, Sherman 1997, Louden 1997, and Korsgaard 1998 
among others).  However, I have never been satisfied that these accounts do justice 
to the fundamental intuitions that lead one to be an Aristotelian or a Kantian.4  Allow 
me to present an admittedly oversimplified account of the distinction.   
 
Kantianism, I believe, is motivated by the intuition that there is a clear line between 
the moral and the immoral, and that any normal human is capable of living morally.  
This intuition is connected to three commitments of Kantian ethics.  First, morality 
can be clearly expressed in precise, generalized rules (“do not murder,” “do not steal,” 
“do not lie,” etc.).  There can, of course, be “quandary cases,” like the runaway 
trolley examples much beloved of contemporary analytic ethicists.  However, I think 
it is central to Kantian intuitions that everyday morality seldom involves genuine 
quandaries.  In addition, as Prof. Stohr notes, we have “imperfect duties,” which do 
not specify or forbid specific actions.  But, once again, Kant does not seem to see the 
demands of imperfect duties as generating any especially troubling quandaries.  
Second, Kantianism requires that we follow the moral rules out of the right motive, 
                                                        
4 There are, as Prof. Stohr illustrates, parts of Kant that sound very much like 
Aristotle.  My concern is that when Kant sounds like Aristotle he does not sound like 
Kant anymore.  In other words, the distinctive aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy 
seem lost at precisely those points where his own common sense pulls him back 
toward Aristotelian intuitions. 
 
  
but this motive is the intention to act in accordance with the moral rules qua moral 
rules.  As rational beings, all humans are capable of acting in accordance with moral 
rules qua moral rules.  This leads us to a third feature of Kantianism:  we cannot, 
according to Kant, fault someone for having or failing to have emotions, since these 
are not within our control.  (“Ought implies can,” as the slogan goes.)  This leaves 
us with a picture in which there is a clear line between the moral and immoral, and 
any normal human can stay on the moral side of the line. 
 
Virtue ethics (like Aristotelianism or Confucianism) is motivated by a very different 
intuition:  ethics is about living the best way of life, and it is a matter of degree how 
well each of us does, or fails to do, this.  This leads virtue ethicists to deny the other 
commitments of Kantianism.  While Aristotelians and Confucians certainly agree 
that we should not cheat others our of their money or kill the innocent to achieve our 
goals, they also hold that much of what is most important about living well goes 
beyond these basic requirements of morality.  Confucianism, in particular, is an 
“ethics of aspiration.”  We must always aspire to be better than we are.  Indeed, 
Confucians condemn those whom they call the “village worthies.”  “Village 
worthies” are those who violate no moral prohibitions, but do not aspire to be 
ethically better. (Trying to be a better person here is not simply a matter of developing 
one’s “talents,” as required by one of Kant’s imperfect duties.) Confucius himself 
even says he would rather have as disciples those who are occasionally hypocritical 
than “village worthies,” because at least the former have high aspirations for 
 
  
themselves, even though they sometimes fail to live up to them (Analects 17.13, 
Mengzi 7B37, and see the helpful discussion in Yearley 1990:  67-72).  
Aristotelians and Confucians also reject the Kantian faith in general moral rules 
because they believe that living well often requires a flexible responsiveness to 
complex situations that cannot be fully codified in advance. Aristotle suggests we 
must use a “flexible ruler” (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5, Chapter 10) to measure 
things, while Confucians contrast the “standard” and “discretionary” (see Mengzi 
4A17 and Wei 1986). Finally, Aristotelians and Confucians hold that a good person 
should have certain feelings or emotions. It is not enough, according to Confucianism, 
that I treat my parents well because of a commitment to the obligation I have incurred 
from their raising me. I must feel respect for them.  What if I currently do not feel 
such respect?  Then I must cultivate this feeling.  This will take time and effort, 
which is why becoming a good person is a matter of degree and a lifelong process. 
B.  The Primacy of Character 
Let us see how the distinction between Kantianism and virtue ethics applies to Prof. 
Stohr’s favorite pop-culture example:   
 
In an episode of the hit television sitcom Seinfeld, the socially inept George 
Costanza starts an argument with Elaine and Jerry about their plan to bring a 
gift to their friends’ dinner party.  George begins by questioning the need to 
bring anything at all, and then makes a case for taking Pepsi and Ring Dings 
instead of wine and chocolate babka, as Elaine proposes.  Elaine and Jerry 
 
  
insist that they have to bring something, but that it most definitely can’t be 
Pepsi and Ring Dings. …acquiring wine and chocolate babka proves to be a 
hugely difficult and time-consuming undertaking.  By the time they get to the 
dinner party, it is late and they are too tired and grumpy to attend the party.  
When the hostess answers the door, they shove the wine and babka at her and 
go home.  (Stohr 2014: 1-2) 
 
What is wrong with Jerry, Elaine, and George? On a Kantian view, we would have to 
say that they have done something immoral.  This seems both too strong and too 
weak.  It is too strong, because the language of “moral” and “immoral” is a bit 
heavy-handed for chocolate babka.  Prof. Stohr acknowledges this difficulty, but 
suggests that some moral demands are simply very important (like not murdering) 
while others are less so (like being a gracious guest) (Stohr, 2012:  5).  But this 
reveals what is “too weak” about the Kantian account in this case.  Is the only thing 
wrong with Jerry, Elaine, and George that they fail (in this particular case) to be 
gracious guests?  The Confucian view would be that their actions are merely 
symptoms of the fact that they lead lives that are shallow.  George says of Jerry in 
one episode:  “His whole life revolves around Superman and cereal” (Seinfeld 1993).  
George is right, but his own life is even more vapid.  On hearing that a famous 
baseball player is a “Civil War buff,” George comments, “I'd love to be a Civil War 
buff. What do you have to do to be a buff?” Jerry replies, “Well, sleeping less than 18 
hours a day would be a start.”  George laughs sarcastically, but does not deny the 
 
  
accusation that he lacks motivation and focus – and he never makes any effort to 
become a “buff” about anything (Seinfeld 1992).  If George, Jerry, and Elaine were 
real humans, they would deserve our contempt or our pity for having desultory lives, 
not merely our judgment that, on this or that occasion, they failed in a minor moral 
obligation. 
 
Consider another fictional example:  “Dr. Gregory House.”  An intriguing irony of 
the character of House is that his motto is “Everybody lies,” yet one of his greatest 
strengths is that he bluntly tells people truths that they do not want to face. It is 
tempting to say that House, and people like him, pose no special problem for a 
Kantian account.  Kant is simply an immoral person from a Kantian perspective, and 
that is all there is to it.  House often manipulates others, and this is a paradigmatic 
violation of the Kantian demand that we treat others as ends in themselves.  When 
House is being bluntly honest, a Kantian would point out that we are not required to 
offer unsolicited truths, and we are obligated to avoid telling the truth in a manner that 
is pointlessly hurtful.5   
 
Once again, though, it feels as if the Kantian account leaves out something important.  
House has many traits that make him a talented and resourceful doctor, as well as a 
                                                        
5 House’s paternalistic treatment of his patients (see Wicclair 2008) is a clear 
violation of the Kantian demand that we respect others as free, rational agents.  For a 
utilitarian reading of House, see Sartin 2008 
 
  
valuable friend.  This is why it is plausible that he inspires loyalty and even love 
among his colleagues.  Being manipulative and bluntly honest is central to the 
complexity of who House is as a person, just as being loyal and kind is central to the 
complexity of who his friend “Wilson” is as a person.6 Each type has strengths and 
weaknesses.  Sometimes a person needs to hear an unpleasant truth, and only 
someone who is painfully blunt can tell him or her.  One is reminded of the 
Confucian Mengzi’s comments on the contrasting styles of the sages Bo Yi and 
Liuxia Hui:  “Bo Yi’s eyes would not look upon evil sights, and his ears would not 
listen to evil sounds”; in contrast, “Liu Xiahui was not ashamed of a corrupt lord and 
did not consider unworthy a petty office” (Mengzi 5B1; Van Norden 2008, pp. 
132-33).  Mengzi stated that “when they hear of the style of Bo Yi, the unperceptive 
develop discretion, and the weak develop resolution.  And when they hear of the 
style of Liuxia Hui, the stingy become generous, and the narrow become tolerant” 
(Mengzi 7B15; Van Norden 1998, 188).  Thinking about individuals in terms of 
which moral rules they do or do not violate encourages us to ignore these 
complexities of character, while a Confucian approach encourages us to explore them. 
C. Practical Reasoning 
Prof. Stohr often makes use of Aristotle.  I found her discussion of Aristotelian 
practical wisdom in particular excellent.  As she notes, “It takes practical wisdom to 
have good manners because behaving politely is far more complicated than simply 
following a list of etiquette rules in a book somewhere” (Stohr, 2012:  27).  (Of 
                                                        
6 This point is made by Battaly and Coplan 2008. 
 
  
course, Aristotelian practical wisdom has important similarities with Confucian 
wisdom.)  So perhaps I am unfairly saddling her with a strict Kantianism that she 
actually has no taste for.  But she does sometimes invoke Kant, and when she does it 
seemed to me to either be the case that there was nothing particularly Kantian about 
her use of Kant, or the use of Kant raised problems that could be easily avoided.  For 
example, in explaining what is wrong with someone cutting in line at Starbucks, Prof. 
Stohr invokes the “humanity formulation” of Kant’s categorical imperative: “rational 
agents are ends in themselves, never to be used as a mere means to someone else’s 
plans or projects” (Stohr, 2012:  10).  Stohr suggest that someone who cuts in line 
at Starbucks is failing to treat others as ends in themselves, whose goals and projects 
are no more or less important than his own:  “He is an equal member of a 
community of rational agents, but he is not superior to anyone in it, nor can his belief 
that he is superior withstand rational scrutiny” (Stohr, 2012:  13). 
 
Something about this sounds right (which is why Kant is a great philosopher whom 
we take seriously).  However, consider how Confucius himself would describe it.  
One of his most famous aphorisms is:  “Do not impose upon others what you 
yourself do not desire” (Analects 15.24; Slingerland, 2003:  183).  You would not 
want someone else to cut in front of you in line, so you should not do it to others.  If 
I ask Confucius why I should not impose upon others what I myself do not desire, I 
suspect that he would say that it is because we are all human beings.  (As 
Confucius’s disciple Zixia said, “Within the four seas, all are brothers” [Analects 12.5; 
 
  
translation mine].) This is close to what Kant says, but notice that we get the same 
ethical conclusion, but without the need for a theory that invokes rational agency, or 
the kingdom of ends, or anything distinctively Kantian. 
 
Consider another example.  Comedic actors David Spade and Chris Farley were best 
friends.  Farley, you will recall, was a talented but troubled entertainer, who died 
young of a drug overdose.  David Spade was about to board the plane for Farley’s 
funeral.  Spade got to the gate, luggage in hand, then turned around and went home, 
missing his best friend’s funeral. Spade would later explain that, “It was just too . . . 
emotional and I wouldn't be able to handle it” (Grow 2014; ellipsis in original).  Did 
Spade do something immoral?  If so, what universal prohibition did he violate?  
These seem to me to be the wrong questions to ask.  In order to live well, humans 
need to grieve the deaths of their loved ones, especially when it happens far too young 
and unexpectedly.  But since the point of grief is catharsis, we need to grieve in a 
way that allows us as individuals to achieve that.  These are generalizations, of 
course, but what they mean depends on the needs of the individual involved.  Were I 
Spade’s close friend, I would have encouraged him to board the plane, and perhaps 
offered to go with him to face this ordeal.  If he still could not go, I would have 
encouraged him to wait until he was ready and find some other way of grieving:  
perhaps visiting the grave at a later time, or even just having a small memorial 
ceremony in his own home with a few close friends.  Concrete suggestions like these 
are relevant to living well and “ethics,” in a broad sense.  In contrast, to label Spade 
 
  
“immoral” for violating some universalizable rule seems not just inaccurate but cruel. 
D. Self-Presentation 
Prof. Stohr makes interesting use of Kant in her discussion of what she calls 
“self-presentation.”  This is really the issue of whether we should keep some things 
private, particularly our own moral failings.  Prof. Stohr suggests that, “although 
Kant doesn’t make this explicit...in presenting myself in a degrading fashion I am, on 
Kant’s view, degrading humanity as such” (Stohr, 2012:  85).  Again, something 
sounds appealing about the view that the cast members of Jersey Shore were 
“degrading humanity as such.”  But let us consider how the Confucian Mengzi 
would describe the issue.  He claims that the two most important human virtues are 
benevolence and righteousness.  Benevolence is having sympathy for the well-being 
of others, while righteousness is having an ethically informed sense of shame.  If I 
parade my wrongdoing and vices in front of others, I obviously have no sense of 
shame.  Mengzi moans, “People may not be shameless.  The shame of being 
shameless is shameless indeed!” (Mengzi 7A6; Van Norden, 2008:  173). Similarly, 
if being exhibitionistic about my vices leads others to take such vices less seriously, 
or even to take me as a role model, then I obviously have no concern for the well 
being of others.  I find the Confucian account here more clear, plausible, and incisive 
than that of Kant.7 
                                                        
7 As an anonymous referee reminded me, this does not mean that Confucians 
advocate concealing one’s faults.  However, they do recognize the healthy mean 




Prof. Stohr makes another provocative use of Kant in the same chapter.  She writes, 
 
In the case of drunkenness, Kant suggests that we bring ourselves below the 
level of animals.  The idea seems to be that when we get drunk, we 
deliberately stunt our rational capacities, which is a worse state than lacking 
those capacities in the first place. ... So for Kant, getting drunk is a violation of 
a duty to myself, but posting on Facebook pictures of myself when I am drunk 
is a violation of a duty to all of humanity. (Stohr, 2012:  84-85) 
 
Now, I am not an advocate of drunkenness. In fact, I do not drink myself (a fact which 
will no doubt surprise old friends from graduate school). But I wonder whether Kant’s 
condemnation of drunkenness is defensible, and even if it is, whether Kant’s relentless 
fixation on rationality has really identified the problem.  This leads naturally into 
another line of critique of Prof. Stohr’s interpretation:  that of Daoism. 
 
II. Daoist Critique 
In this section I shall discuss three hypothetical challenges to Stohr’s approach, based 
upon Daoism.  (A) Is intoxication always wrong? (B) Would we be better off 
without ritual? (C) Even if we need to practice rituals, would it be a higher 
achievement to practice them without feeling any attachment to them?  I think 
Confucianism can mount plausible defenses to these challenges, but I am interested in 
 
  
how Prof. Stohr would respond. 
A. Intoxication 
Chinese poetry influenced by Daoism often touches on drunkenness, and typically not 
in a negative tone.  Indeed, one of the greatest Chinese poets was Li Bai (Li Po; 
701-762), who often celebrated intoxication in his poetry.  A representative work is 
his “Waking from Drunkenness on a Spring Day”: 
 
“Life in the world is but a big dream; 
I will not spoil it by any labour or care.” 
So saying, I was drunk all the day, 
Lying helpless at the porch in front of my door. 
When I awoke, I blinked at the garden-lawn; 
A lonely bird was singing amid the flowers. 
I asked myself, had the day been wet or fine? 
The Spring wind was telling the mango-bird. 
Moved by its song I soon began to sigh, 
And as wine was there, I filled my own cup. 
Wildly singing, I waited for the moon to rise, 
When my song was over, all my senses had gone. (Waley, 1918: n.p.) 
 
If we interpret Li Bai in his particular social and intellectual context, we realize that 
 
  
he is not celebrating drunkenness for the sake of drunkenness.8  But he certainly is 
getting drunk.  Yet for over a thousand years countless discerning readers in China, 
Japan, and the West have deeply admired his poetry, without thinking that he had 
committed a “violation of a duty to all of humanity.”9  I am interested in whether 
Prof. Stohr thinks that drunkenness is always degrading to humanity (both in oneself 
and in others).  If so, what counts as “drunkenness”?  Does it just mean being 
“blackout drunk,” or could it include milder states of intoxication?  Finally, if I can 
bring up virtue ethics just one more time:  I would personally judge quite differently 
a college student who posted a photo of himself drunk on Facebook, as opposed to 
                                                        
8 As Philip J. Ivanhoe (2013) has noted, Confucians advocate moderate drinking 
because of its value in promoting social intercourse; however, some Daoists advocate 
drinking to inebriation precisely because it allows us to mute social artifice and the 
rational parts of our consciousness. Benn (2005) is an excellent discussion of the 
Buddhist advocacy of “Mr. Tea” over “Mr. Alcohol” (as they are personified in the 
茶酒論).  Of course, some Westerners have advocated the use of psychedelic drugs 
for their alleged spiritual benefits (e.g., Huxley 2009). 
9 Li Bai has had his share of detractors.  Some accuse him of shallowness or stylistic 
faults (as did Bai Juyi), but others share the moral assessment of Wang Anshi:  “The 
reason why vulgar people find Li Po’s poetry congenial is that it is easy to enjoy. His 
intellectual outlook was mean and sordid, and out of ten poems nine deal with wine or 
women; nevertheless, the abundance of his talent makes it impossible to leave him out 
of account” (Waley, 1918: n.p.). 
 
  
someone my age who did so.  This reflects my sense that life is not about simple 
Kantian dichotomies of moral and immoral, but involves ethical complexity and 
growth, so what is forgivable in a young person exploring the new freedom of college 
and finding out who he is, may be much more problematic for a middle-aged person 
with serious responsibilities. 
B. Dispensing with Ritual 
Next, I shall discuss the critiques of manners and etiquette suggested by the 
Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. 10   The Daodejing associates etiquette with the 
corrupting influences of higher civilization:   
 
Those of highest Virtue do not act “Virtuously,”  
And thus they have Virtue.   
Those of lowest Virtue never lose “Virtue,”  
And thus they have no Virtue.   
Those of highest Virtue engage in nonaction,  
And do nothing purposefully.   
Those of lowest Virtue act  
And do so purposefully.   
 
                                                        
10 Obviously, there are many ways to read these famously enigmatic texts.  I defend 
and elaborate upon my interpretations in Van Norden 2011, Van Norden 1999, and 
Van Norden 1996. 
 
  
Those of highest benevolence act,  
But do nothing purposefully.   
Those of highest righteousness act, 
And do so purposefully.   
Those of highest propriety [i.e., manners and etiquette] act 
And, when no one responds, roll up their sleeves and resort to force.   
 
Hence, when the Way [to live] was lost, only then was there “Virtue.”  
When “Virtue” was lost, only then was there “benevolence.”   
When “benevolence” was lost, only then was there “righteousness.”   
When “righteousness” was lost, only then was there “propriety” [i.e., manners 
and etiquette].   
“Propriety” is the wearing thin of loyalty and trustworthiness;  
It is the beginning of chaos.   (Daodejing 38; translation mine)  
 
The argument of this passage is that humans in a pre-civilized state had a sort of 
Virtue that was automatic and unselfconscious.  As civilization develops, humans 
become more self-conscious in their actions, but this also introduces the capacity for 
hypocrisy.  Manners and etiquette are the ultimate of this hypocrisy, purely artificial 
and far removed from the spontaneous harmony of a simpler civilization. 
 
I personally find the Daodejing’s dream of a primitive utopia naive.  I find more 
 
  
plausible the view that the state of nature is one of endless conflict, until a 
government authority is instituted to ensure uniformity of values.  I am referring, of 
course, to the state of nature argument given by the Chinese Mohist philosophers 
(Mozi, “Identifying with One’s Superior”).  (I think it is just adorable, though, that 
Thomas Hobbes came up with a version of this argument, albeit one much less 
sophisticated, two millennia later.)  But while we may not go as far as the Daodejing, 
it does seem to raise a plausible concern that etiquette can become an impediment to 
the expression of genuine feelings. 
 
Prof. Stohr is aware of this danger.  She uses Edith Wharton’s novel, The Age of 
Innocence, to illustrate “a society which values propriety above just about everything 
else” (Stohr, 2012:  71), and remarks that “the social world that Wharton describes is, 
to put it mildly, unappealing” (Stohr, 2012:  72).  But isn’t the lesson to learn that, 
the less etiquette the better?  In motivating a concern with manners, Prof. Stohr 
mentions problems in contemporary society including “attack ads in political 
campaigns, rude and unnecessarily inflammatory protests, road rage that quickly 
escalates into violence” (Stohr, 2012:  5).  But none of these is an issue about 
etiquette, per se.  In fact, in many ways, we seem better off today because we have 
less etiquette.  Are we worse off today because a couple can get married by an Elvis 
impersonator while skydiving?  Is it a decline in civilization that some teenagers 
show up to Prom with pink mohawks and nose rings?  Aren’t these things rather 
signs of greater freedom, creativity, and pluralism?  We do still expect people to 
 
  
show up for job interviews dressed in sophisticated clothes, but this often becomes a 
serious problem for the long-term unemployed, who may have no clean dress clothes 
anymore, or those whose underprivileged upbringing did not equip them with the 
knowledge of what sort of clothes one wears to a white-collar job interview. In short, 
even if we cannot completely eliminate etiquette, aren’t we better off the fewer rules 
of etiquette there are?   
 
Turning to the Zhuangzi, we note that parts are similar to the Daodejing in endorsing 
a simple rejection of conventional etiquette.  When Confucius’s disciple Zigong 
discovers two Daoist sages happily ignoring the rules of mourning after the death of 
their close friend, he is outraged.  But Confucius (who here acts as Zhuangzi’s 
spokesman) expresses wistful admiration for their ability (which he admits he lacks) 
“to be deviant among humans yet to fit in with Heaven” (畸於人而侔於天; 
Zhuangzi 6; translation mine).  There is also the famous story of Zhuangzi himself 
playing a tub like a drum when he is supposed to be following the somber mourning 
rituals for his wife’s death (Zhuangzi 18). 
C. Practicing Rituals with Detachment 
Other parts of the Zhuangzi suggest a critique of etiquette that is more subtle, yet also 
more radical.  Consider the description of Mengsun Cai:  “…when his mother died 
he cried without shedding tears, and felt no sadness in his heart.  He took part in 
mourning, but felt no sorrow” (Zhuangzi 6; translation mine).  Confucius (speaking 
for Zhuangzi again) comments, “You and I – are we not people who are asleep and 
 
  
have not yet awakened?  … Mengsun has awakened.  Others cry so he cries…” 
(Zhuangzi 6; translation mine).  I think it is illuminating to read this passage in the 
light of Zhuangzi’s parable of the monkey trainer, who tells the monkeys that they 
will be fed three acorns in the morning and four at night.  The monkeys are furious 
with this meal plan.  “Fine,” says the monkey trainer.  “Then I’ll give you four in 
the morning and three at night.”  The monkeys are completely satisfied with this 
“compromise” (Zhuangzi 2; translation mine).  Zhuangzi suggests that the sage, like 
the monkey trainer, recognizes the pointlessness of the values that motivate ordinary 
people.  Nonetheless, the sage can act in accordance with the superficial forms of 
human behavior (like Mengsun crying on the surface or carrying out the forms of 
mourning).  In fact, someone who made a show of violating etiquette would only do 
so because she took human conventions far too seriously.11    
 
Consequently, Zhuangzi might claim that the problem with Jerry, Elaine, and George 
is not that they fail to understand or take seriously the underlying “principles and 
ideals” that provide the point for etiquette.  The problem is that they continue to take 
                                                        
11 When Hugh Laurie was offered the Order of the British Empire, he considered 
turning it down, but he was advised by his son to accept, on the grounds that only 






themselves and their own projects too seriously.  Jerry et al. arrive tired and irritable 
at the party because they feel that they have wasted their time in a pointless but 
socially unavoidable effort to procure gifts suitable for sophisticated, tasteful adults.  
But what would they have been doing instead of trying to get chocolate babka?  
Presumably, they would have been chatting in the coffeehouse, or waiting in line at a 
Chinese restaurant, or gossiping about the other people at the party, or...something 
else equally pointless.  Zhuangzi’s recommendation is not that they should have 
more valuable concerns and activities.  Rather, if they fully and joyfully embraced 
the pointlessness of whatever they did, they could be equally happy in any of these 
situations.  If they were that sort of people, they would not have been tired and 
irritable when they showed up for the party.  In addition, they might have had the 
flexibility to see that something else besides babka could make a perfectly good gift 
(even if the Pepsi and Ring Dings that George suggested isn’t it). 
 
Conclusion 
Prof. Stohr has an excellent chapter on “Giving and Receiving.”  In particular, her 
overview of the ethical distinctions surrounding “gifts,” “favors,” and “advice” (Stohr, 
2012:  118) is masterful.  She also notes in this chapter that, “ideally, I would both 
feel grateful for what I am given and express that gratitude appropriately” (Stohr, 
2012:  128), and that “the practice of exchanging things like gifts and favors works 
best when it is reciprocal” (Stohr, 2012:  130).  So allow me to conclude by 
sincerely thanking you, Prof. Stohr, for writing this book. I wanted to get you a 
 
  
thank-you gift in return, but I wasn’t sure what you like, so please accept these 
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